Fighting in the streets

  • Posted on: 24 February 2012
  • By: worker

<table><tr><td>From <a href=" Reader</a> - by Sam Worley

<a href=" police officers feel nervous</a> about the upcoming G8 and NATO summit protests. But the protesters&#8212;they&#8217;re the ones who are <i>un</i>armed&#8212;have reason to be leery, too, at least if the Chicago Police Department ends up actually going into the protests as ill-prepared as some officers fear. Fran Spielman wrote recently in the <i>Sun-Times</i> on plans for both the cops and their horses to be <a href=" with riot gear</a>, and one imagines that more will follow. Usually cops will bring a gun&#8212;also a Taser, bean bag rounds, stun grenades, rubber bullets, tear gas, pepper spray, and the occasional armored personnel carrier&#8212;to a street fight. </p>

<p>Last year, in a blog post, the <i>Atlantic</i>&#8217;s Alexis Madrigal wrote that he <a href=" bad for John Pike</a>, the UC-Davis police officer who sprayed a seated group of protesters. Pike was simply the product of a tradition of policing that preceded him, Madrigal wrote.</p></td><td><img title="Poor cops. It must suck to win at asymmetrical warfare." src=""></td><...
<p>He referred to Patrick Gillham&#8217;s recent paper &#8220;Securitizing America,&#8221; in which the sociologist describes three eras of police response to mass protests. In the 1960s, it was &#8220;escalated force&#8221;: &#8220;Police sought to maintain law and order often trampling on protesters&#8217; First Amendment rights, and frequently resorted to mass and unprovoked arrests and overwhelming and indiscriminate use of force.&#8221; By the 70s, the tactic had provoked enough public animus that a milder form came to prevail: &#8220;negotiated management,&#8221; which &#8220;encouraged active cooperation between police and protesters through the use of a standardized permitting system.&#8221; For several decades, this strategy emphasized negotiation and compromise. It relied on a hierarchical protest movement, with identifiable leaders with whom cops could negotiate. </p>

<p>Globalization-era protests, though, weren't always organized by hierarchy, and the negotiated-management strategy broke down during the Seattle World Trade Organization protests in 1999. Accounts of what happened vary. According to then Seattle chief of police Norm Stamper, who resigned after the protests, trouble started when protesters blocked an intersection, and cops decided to use force to clear it. &#8220;My support for a militaristic solution caused all hell to break loose,&#8221; Stamper <a href=" in the <i>Nation</i> last year</a>. According to a <a href="">University of Washington history</a>, &#8220;Further problems developed when youthful, out-of-control, self-proclaimed 'anarchists' joined the more serious WTO-focused protestors.&#8221;</p>
<p>According to Gillham, the chaos in Seattle marked a "watershed" change in U.S. police agencies&#8217; approaches to mass protest.</p>

<p>&#8220;The police response to Seattle was shaped by a shift in the broader criminal justice system informed by a <i>new penology</i> philosophy,&#8221; he writes (italics in the original). &#8220;It conceives crime as systemic rather than individualized and stresses the need to identify potential victims and preemptively protect them.&#8221; This dovetailed with the police response to September 11: &#8220;security and neutralization of the threat became the central focus of law enforcement.&#8221; </p>
<p>Gillham calls this &#8220;strategic incapacitation.&#8221; You can draw a straight line from Seattle to the Occupy protests, which have been met on a number of occasions&#8212;<a href="">particularly in Oakland</a>&#8212;with disproportionate police violence.</p>

<p>There were stops along the way&#8212;I was around for one of them. When I was a junior in college in Minnesota, a group of us, novices all, trekked down to Miami for the 2003 Free Trade Area of the Americas protests. These turned out to be, by anybody&#8217;s accounting, a disaster: what we encountered there was a police force (actually, many counties&#8217; police forces on loan to Miami, in addition to the local PD) that was extravagantly militarized. Helicopters circled overhead day and night. There were undercover cops everywhere. There were armored personnel carriers. The riot police were practically cyborgs, and phalanxes of cops on bikes could be anywhere at a moment&#8217;s notice. </p>
<p>The force was overseen by John Timoney, whose bona fides had included the violent suppression of protests at the 2000 Republican National Convention in Philadelphia, where he was chief of police. <a href=" to the <i>Guardian</i></a>, </p>
<p><blockquote>The ACLU's Philadelphia chapter denounced Timoney's department for collaborating with the state police to infiltrate and spy on protest groups, in violation of a mayoral decree. Before the protests began Timoney's officers conducted raids of warehouses and spaces where activists where constructing puppets and banners for the demonstrations. . . . In Philadelphia Timoney's officers favored a hands-on approach to managing demonstrators. [Activist John] Sellers explained, "It was much more of an up close and personal, beat-you-down kind of violence in the streets. Cops were smashing people with bicycles and nightsticks."</blockquote></p>
<p>After the FTAA, this came to be called the Miami Model, a regime under which street protest is put down by a matrix of brute force, mass arrests, and old-school police infiltration. A local circuit court judge said that during the 2003 protests he saw &#8220;'no less than 20 felonies committed by police officers,&#8221; and that the MPD&#8217;s actions were &#8220;a disgrace for the community.&#8221; The <a href=" New Times</i></a>:</p>

<p><blockquote>From FTAA's start, Timoney locked down the city's center. Then he dispatched 2500 officers in riot gear against about 12,000 protesters. The cops used rubber bullets, shields, batons, concussion grenades, and stun guns. The "rough start," Timoney would later explain, was needed because some demonstrators didn't have permits. Sixty people were taken into custody; many were beaten by cops. . . .</p>
<p>Fallout from the FTAA riots continued in 2004. Accountants totaled costs for security around $23.9 million. The American Civil Liberties Union received 150 complaints alleging police abuse and filed six lawsuits on behalf of protesters in federal court . . . The city settled for $180,000 with an independent filmmaker named Carl Kessler after he was injured by a police beanbag fired into his face. And the Miami Civilian Investigative Panel issued a report criticizing cops for profiling and unlawfully searching protesters.</blockquote></p>
<p>The least of the police violence my friends and I encountered in Miami also happened to be the weirdest. The day before the protests started, a group of us were walking through the downtown district. It was an eerie scene: on advice from the police department, most shops were closed and boarded up, and the few people hanging around seemed to be plainclothes cops. One of these spotted a friend of mine pick up a coconut from the ground&#8212;we were from the upper midwest, it was a novelty&#8212;but seemed not to spot him drop it a few steps later.</p>
<p>We stepped out into an intersection, and found ourselves surrounded by cops on bikes, who ordered us to put our hands against the nearest building. There were at first about two dozen of them, and then dozens more. What cops weren&#8217;t focused on us spent their time pointing Tasers at random bystanders, as if a riot might erupt at any moment. There had been a report that somebody in our group had picked up a weapon, they said&#8212;a coconut. They searched everybody&#8217;s bag. A couple of them got into a fight about it. &#8220;I&#8217;ve seen <i>pens</i> used as guns, man,&#8221; one cop told his partner. </p>

<p>It was around this point that a bunch of union members started to stream out of their nearby hotel. They took an interest in the scene on the corner, and, as I recall, started chanting in the direction of the police (&#8220;Let them go,&#8221; etc), who continued to point Tasers at everybody in sight. Eventually it was established that there was no coconut in our possession. Though I do remember some effects of personal hygiene&#8212;maybe contact solution?&#8212;being confiscated.</p>
<p>Two ironies: One, this era of police response has introduced, among other things, what are called &#8220;free-speech zones&#8221; around summit sites. This is basically the sort of language people mean when they use the word &#8220;Orwellian,&#8221; and though that's frankly the least of the problems at these protests, it's a striking indication of police attitudes. Two, John Timoney is now <a href=" the Bahraini police force</a>, which has a history of untoward activity, on how <i>not</i> to abuse citizens. </p>

<p>And one omission, from Alexis Madrigal, who notes the ways that broader access to media making and media dissemination have &#8220;allowed everyone to see what only a tiny number did back in 2003 in Miami&#8221;:</p>
<p><blockquote>While it's easiest to note the incidents of police violence, the protesters' cameras also record what's *not* in the images. Authorities have long claimed that they were merely battling the "black bloc" of violent anarchists. But when you look at all these videos, the bogeyman isn't there.</blockquote></p>
<p>The bogeyman, nonetheless, remains. In the&#8212;pardon the phrase&#8212;mainstream media, no account of a protest is complete without two things. First, the relentless placement of the word &#8220;anarchist&#8221; within quotation marks, as if the reporter is referring to a self-identified human Molotov cocktail and not, after all, to the human proponent of a specific political philosophy. Second, the hoary old trope about protesters&#8212;the aforementioned "black bloc"&#8212;throwing bodily fluids at the police, repeated to comic effect but rarely, if ever, in evidence at actual protests. Toward the end of her recent story, Spielman obliges on both points. She&#8217;s talking with Fraternal Order of Police president John Shields about his need for a certain kind of protection: &#8220;Shields demanded the new shields to prevent his officers from being blinded by bags of urine and feces thrown at them by &#8216;anarchists&#8217; and other hard-core protesters.&#8221; The police may not have their shields yet, but ideologically, at least, they seem prepared enough.</p>


can't stop the chios.

cant stop the chinos


i see wat u did there.


Yeah, whatever, we'll see about that.

this was sarcasm

I kinda figured, but just threw it out there anyway, for future reference to all naysayers.

Someone should post that chicago spring article here so we can watch the nothing is happening in chicago and no city within 1000 miles is even planning on coming people show up


Wait, what?

hahaha you're an idiot if you think anyone is planning on going to chicago other than the usual "protest everything" activist morons like Code Pink et al.


what is a "coconut?"

The Miami Model can be beaten. All it marks is the end of the 1999-2001 period in which police were routinely unable to win set-piece, conventional battles against protesters with lighter arms but more numbers. Think like a guerrilla, only offer battle when you have the advantage, and the Miami Model falls apart.

I was in NYC for the 2004 RNC protests, and with 250,000 people we made the NYPD eat their words about keeping us out of Central park. Despite mass arrests and brutality, the NYPD failed to sucessfully implement the "Miami Model. On that main day, WE had the advantage to to an over 10-1 numerical advantage, so we pressed our advantage home while we could.

Fast-forwaerd five years to the 2009 Pittsburgh G20. There are only about 750 cops there normally, though they were no doubt reinforced by outsiders for the Sep G20 protests. The anticapitalist march on Day 1 was about 1.000 strong, for a 5-4 numerical advantage over the normal Pittsburgh cops (all of them). This was a far worse correlation of forces than Miami, much less our huge edge in NYC, but in terrain favoring defense and small unit action. They could keep us out of downtown, but could neither break us up nor protect their assets caught behind our lines. Still a "conventional" engagement, but on terrain overwhelmingly favoring us.

Pittsburgh was a spectacular failure for the Miami Model: A whole weeks shopping driven away by militarizes policing cost maybe 100 times the property damage total of about $50K. Four hours of police FIRING rubber bullets, chemicals, and even the LRAD failed to stop the anticapitalist march. That night, a ten times smaller "Bash Back" march hit them again and doubled our "points on the board. The next day 10,000 people marched against the G20, after a night that saw police flailing away in raids on the university instead of protesters.

Both the earlier RNC 2008 and later Toronto 2010 G20 showed yet a different situation: Anticapitalist tactics developed to counter the Miami model were enough to dominate the streets for essentially one day of fighting. After that, the cops caught their breath, adjusted tactics,and regained the edge, something insurgents must never allow to happen.

In the classic insurgent model, this would mean removing our forces immediately after any such one-day victory over a heavier force , including providing temporary out-of-town shelter for local activists, so police have nothing to hit back at but air.

Occupy is new, while older anticapitalist have been fighting essentially the same cops back to Miami and before, meaning we know and expect their moves. Occupy is vulnerable to the Miami Model only because they have yet to learn to counter it. in paerticular, the moderate left political stance of many occupiers has limited the retaliatory strikes against the property of the wealthy that have often accompanied police violence against, say, DC's IMF protesters or California's animal rights activsts.

Occupy's traditional dependance of operating out of fixed locations also is a severe disadvantage in any fight aqgainst a heavier force. The single most important lesson of a guerilla war is this: To win, the guerrilla must fight only at times and places of his/her choosing and avoid fights at times and places of the Enemy's choosing, something that is hard to do at a 24-7 Occupy camp. In fact, fixed bases played a big role in the massacre of ther Tamil Tigers and the severe weakening of FARC by enemy military offensives.

All the Miami model really means is this: If you are a cop, don't let the more lightly armed or unarmed force defeat your heavier force in a conventional engagement, use your existing assets ruthlessly instead. To us, that means avoid a set-piece battle, take the fight to places WE have the advantage, like IMF protesters ignoring the fortified meeting site and hitting delegate hotels instead. Avoid battle with superior forces, carry the fight to the Enemy in multiple small units, and the Miami model is finished! Just imagine if Timoney had had to deal in 2003 with squads size units of 8-12 people attacking targets all over a 100 mile radius from the FTAA, and infrastructure problems stemming from attacks by something like Anonymous providing our "air support."

this has been tried and is usually a dismal failure. there is strength in numbers, even if it's not as much strength as the police have...

If large numbers of protesters who know what they are doing break into a large number of teams, each with its own target and mission, the cops also have to divide their forces. This is especially an advantage in tight quarters where if two large units clash only a few people on each side can reach each other to fight.

That is because, like the Persians against the Greeks at Salamis, tight quarters can neutralize a numerical advantage. If we outnumber the cops, we should take advantage of it, forcing all of them to fight all of us, so that their advantages in equipment are less of a factor than they would be if equal numbers are in contact from larger dissimilar forces.

In addition, police comms as well as police training are poorly suited to fighting a large number of simultanious "brush-fire" actions. The first few actions would be diversions, as the police will be responding to them. Once it gets going, a lot of the teams with real targets will be able to carry out their missions and escape before police can even arrive.

Doing this right can work like opposing a platoon of infantry, not with another infantry platoon, but with 5 squads of SEALS instead. They can work together or work in their separate teams, as the situation calls for. I've always said we need to think like insurgents and special operations units, not like regular army, except in those situations where we have riot shields, etc and the police did NOT bring them, something I have seen but not that often.

Years ago, I was in a 230 rider Critical Mass ride during IMF. We had someone monitoring the police radios, and when the ride split into two groups, the police comms got totally confused. They were unable to spring their planned mass arrest for over two hours, and when they finally got around us after the ride had been reunited for a while, they were only able to catch 37 riders out of 230. The bikes they stole were released when threats were made that 37 yuppie bikes would otherwise be liberated as replacments.

Yes, police crowd control tactics also focus on breaking crowds up, usually when they face battle in open spaces that give the advantage to the larger unit. The key assumption of these tactics is that people in that crowd are not in small teams that can operate independently, and therefore are out of action if the large unit can be dispersed. When this assumption is proven wrong, it is usually to the severe detriment of the police and their masters.

Do you realize the sort of logistical support it would take, to organize 500 anarchists (who could be coming from who knows how far away) into small fighting organizations, with enough determination, and confidence to actually attack shit?

How can we effectively select targets and assign them to affinity groups? You want a group of 10 or 15 people to plan this? How can we protect them and make sure they don't catch conspiracy charges? What will we do, when every individual arrested faces charges of conspiracy or terrorism? How will we plan this kind of actions when there is no established secure form of contacting all the people who will be attending? What about the people who are going to show up without an affinity group? What will they do?

I mean, I dig it, it would be really cool if the anarchist movement was an effective resistance organization. But its not, and its never, ever, going to be. You've gotta work with what you actually have. You can say "we should do x" all day, but its just not realistic.

It is now WHAT we do to the targets, but HOW we do it that I am really discussing here. It is the how that needs to adjust as security measures adjust to previous tactics. WHAT we do is an entirely separate discussion.

This does, in fact, mean using the resources we already have. Most serious activists are involved in a variety of community-based organizations and have a core group of like-minded activist friends who prefer to deploy together. This is all an affinity group is. Think in terms of military squads: 8-12 people per affinity group, best of all if sub-grouped into teams of 4 or so who REALLY know and trust each other and use the same tactics.

Just 5 of these squad-size groups can sow total chaos and an incredible amount of havoc for which the cops are simply not prepared. The larger crew allows dedicating several people to security while others service the target. Even if you are just waking up a CEO with a bullhorn, it's good to have someone watch your back. If there are just 4 people per team, three on target and one on security/lookout is probably best.

There will always be people who must arrive alone, due to isolated communites, etc. Solo operators should focus on scouting, video, overwatch/radio monitoring, and other tasks for which a team would otherwise have to detach someone. In this way, solo activists too can contribute, so long as at least half of the turnout for the serious action is in their pre-existing affinity groups.

If there will unavoidably be a large number of unaffiliated people, they should do street marches and other things that are both public protests and diversions protecting other actions. Team with other missions should not be in these marches, to prevent mass arrests from pre-empting what happens next. It is also critical to make sure that there is no legally sound way to charge anyone arrested in a street march for something that happens elsewhere, suggesting compartmenting information.

Let's go back to the 1,000 people at the Pittsburgh G20 anticapitalist action for a moment. Consider 50% of that 1,000 in teams of 8-12, averaging 10. That's 50 independent teams that can service 50 separate targets all at the same time, or combine into several platoon-size units of 3-5 teams for more complex actions like street blockades or building takeovers. While all this happens, there is a snake march. If any one team achieves overwhelming success, the snake march charges in to reinforce. otherwise it puts on a show for the media and draw the police away.

You are right, however, about one thing: We cannot assemble last-minute teams from people that don't know and trust each other. I've seen this tried and fail miserably. People don't know each other's moves and must assume unknown members could even be snitches or spies, removing the element of trust that makes for unit cohesion under fire. That also means that no such scratch team can take on any mission carrying serious legal risks due to the risk of an unknown person being a rat.

Target coordination is ugly. Assigned targets creates the danger of a snitch on the committee that assigns targets. That would send every team into a trap, followed by exactly the sort of charges you mention. At any rate, for anyone to know time and place but not be on the team is an unacceptable hazard in our community.

Probably each team has to pick their own target, a primary and two backups. If they see pigs or another team on target, divert to a secondary target. This way, only the list of availabe targets, which must be far too large for the opposition to protect them all, becomes hazardous, and only to it's creators. That is a job local activsts would need to do in an absolutely and totally deniable manner, probably with the entire crew that creates the info packets taking an out of town vacation when the shit goes down.

You are right about communications security. This site is unencrypted, for instance, but at least does not snitch. Twitter and Facebook need to be taken out of consideration RIGHT NOW, and smartphones are impossible to secure. There are a lot of good comms ideas I cannot discuss over any public forum, as they would then be less secure if someone decides on their own to implement them.

Legal risks are for legal support to research, then publish information about the laws and their typical use. Activists, whether solo or in teams, can then decide for themselves what risks are acceptable and how far to escalate. Compartmentalization becomes critical to protecting anyone arrested for a minor action from being pressured to snitch on a different team's far heavier action, but this is inherent in the philophy of diversity of tactics and cannot be avoided.

In my experience, it is housing and transport that are usually the worst logistics problems. Comms is going to become one with the necessity to dump Twitter and Facebook, upon which too many people have become dependent, especially among the Occupy movement.

"Probably each team has to pick their own target, a primary and two backups. If they see pigs or another team on target, divert to a secondary target."

Yeah, this is a good idea. Another way to avoid traps, but without giving up information to snitches, while maintaining large group coordination, is to have the autonomous affinity groups (through a secure comm, of course) alert the larger body of it's intended target IMMEDIATELY PRIOR to attacking the target. I'm talking about 5 minutes before attack. This will allow for groups to keep from bumping into each other, and allowing pressure to be equally applied on all targets. It would be important to avoid multiple affinity groups awkwardly showing up to the same target, but we need to be quicker than the enemy's intelligence. This is entirely possible. We can't let security culture fears keep us stagnant. There are many ways to avoid traps without relying on stiff, large group organizing.

Instantaneous and spontaneous actions are our advantage in asymmetrical warfare. The collecting of targets from local activists can be done anonymously, further debilitating the state's ability to effectively prosecute individuals, at least within the bounds of their own law. I understand the coordinating committees are important for transparency, but we shouldn't just advertise a whole group or space for raids and such. Besides, marches are spectacle, and should be considered as, tactically, nothing more than diversion. This is war, not politic, and we need to realize this. If we can maintain fluid mobility, we can actually prove to the rest of these movements how anarchists can start to attack the status quo materially, as well as existentially.

What you're talking about still relies on some sort of formal organization which can exist to identify targets, organize support, and disseminate information. That sort of stuff puts individuals at such an extreme risk level that they'd essentially have to be "underground", at which point they're gonna have a very hard time building a network of people to actually distribute their information to.

Also, comms are ALWAYS the weak link. I have 6 years of military experience, including a combat deployment. And comms will always fail, always.

I mean, I see the advantage of what you're suggesting, but I don't see it as feasible for the kind of movement we have, or even the kind of movement we want. Dedicated cells of anarchists are no substitute for the actions of the working class/dispossessed.

We don't need to turn anarchy into a movement of underground street fighters...

>> I don't see it as feasible for the kind of movement we have, or even the kind of movement we want

who is this "we" that you speak of? or should i say, speak for.

QUESTION - COP DEFECTORS? I know this is an older post...but i would like to ask a question. I'm a grad student and i like to think of myself as a radical, i'm all about these tactics to bypass police and military tactics...given the situation in the taking of key locations (hospitals) and the arrests of key people involved in movement (ie medics) the intelligence kidnapping, torture, information and psychological tactics that screwed with the heads of activists and set up a situation to decrease support from the masses with the information tactics...not to mention the control over communication that can be cut off at anytime...
does anyone ever wonder if they think the appendage of the state (the police and military) are composed of humans...people.. i believe, unless their heartless clones which they could be. has there been any attention to how to create defectors?? how to embed oneself with the police or military in a way that rouses support for disobedience in the face of human rights violations such as this torture of citizens with rubber bullets, tazers, capture, detaining etc.... is it too outragous to think that a campaign built (along side anarchist groups concerned with building community, activities, etc...) and another section concerned with i would term infiltrating, but to sound less arrestable...movements dedicated to appealing to cops and military class positions, offsetting their training, in hopes that if a day comes you build to numbers that matter, you can be somewhat confident that there will be a number of defectors who refuse to follow orders?? is this a bad idea to research? forget?? follow through??
does it do you more good to have insider information on the miami model... or research looking at the "weak points" of the officers and soldiers themselves?
i look forward to a response here :)

Unit cohesion defeats this entirely, and cops have very strong unit cohesion. Think "police culture", even in non-confrontational settings police act as a unit, it's cops vs "civilians", and all "civilians" are potential arrestees. In a street sweep, or riot control formation, anything that isn't police is enemy, whether they're in black hoodys or old hippies or whatever. Human considerations went out the window a long time ago, you're looking out for your fellow officers. So forget it.

they work like the fuckin ancient roman fuckin phalanx its a fuckin formula nof total fuckin nonempathy and anyone who doesnt take orders anti-sheepish is the fuckin enemy!.,.,8ball

have we made total destroy yet?!

afraid not, but communization is outright sexy, comrade.

no, first we have to freak out the cops so they turn Chicago into a police state for no reason, then everyone will make total destroy because they will not like it. our plan is working perfectly.


dat foucaultivist?

yes, and i hope this knowledge will be useful to you in panopticon F.

can't stop the Chaos WOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO

Can't we just organize a picket at starbucks or something? Anarcho-Syndicalism is the only anarchism.

Chicago anarchists need to get their ass in the game. This is ridiculous. Chicago is a great local for anarchists to converge, and the cops are seriously stretched to the limit, especially with all of the occupy aholes. Obviously, anarchists aren't involved in the liberal organizing, which is good. But there is nothing so much as a schedule for the two-week period from anarchists. We need at least a few days of action where we can do our own shit, or else people won't know when and where to show up, and we'll be melted in with the liberal bullshit and it will be a horrible experience.

Agreed, why is there no (A) call-out, schedule, or even just timeline?! NONE of these tactics will work if we all show up for a different 3-4 day stretch over this 2-week period? Unless I'm wrong and someone can point me to a schedule, it seems like the occupiers are more organized than the (A)-team? Or is this another tactic? Yet it seems like not communicating dates is meaningless, since the city's already going to be militarized regardless.... Could someone help me out here?!

all anarchists meet at the pizza place on washington and 3rd. the first day of the summit. there ya go. done.

Check out the comment thread under the post: "Mayor Retreats on G8/NATO Fines" - explains a little more, looks like there's no organizing whatsoever... shit-show

It seems like theres gonna be thousands of people heading to Chicago with no real clear plan. There is still almost 3 months left prior to this happening. There are already caravan plans from all over the united states from a quick search on FB. Should be interesting.

Asymmetric warfare - it's not "protest' anymore, it's warfighting. If the "police" come equipped to do battle, then it's no longer "protest", no matter what your intentions are, peaceful or not.

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