From Books & Ideas / La Vie des Idées, by Cyril Legrand , 21 November, translated by Arianne Dorval

About: Catherine Malabou, Au voleur ! Anarchisme et philosophie, Puf

Whether conceived as advocacy of disorder or as “the highest expression of order,” as the abolition of the state or as state-led deregulation, anarchy feeds on every ambiguity. This is the case even in contemporary philosophy.

Catherine Malabou’s latest book can be read as the story of a misunderstanding: the conceptual and political misunderstanding surrounding anarchy and anarchism.

The terms “anarchy” and “anarchism” are admittedly confusing. Long synonymous with chaos and disorder, they have been used since the nineteenth century to also designate an organized political movement—which has taken on a variety of forms—and a social ideal—described by contrast as “the highest expression of order” by Élisée Reclus. [1] As if this ambiguity were not enough, anarchism, which is by definition anti-state, is now sometimes associated with forms of state deregulation and withdrawal. Malabou herself strangely adds to this confusion when she uses the term “de facto anarchism” (in contrast to “dawning anarchism”) to designate the anomie of a social world “condemned to a horizontality of desertion,” or when she evokes “the anarchist turn in capitalism,” Donald Trump’s anarchism, “cyber-anarchism,” or “market anarchism.” This is all very perplexing.

What Malabou euphemistically calls the “polymorphism of anarchism”—where one might be tempted to see a certain conceptual disorder—is aggravated by the specific subject of the book: namely, the way in which a number of contemporary philosophers have recently taken up the concept of “anarchy” without declaring themselves anarchist and have thereby engaged in a “paradoxical form of anarchy without anarchism.”

Anarchy Without Anarchism

Indeed, none of the concepts eruditely discussed by Malabou in the central chapters of the book—Reiner Schürmann’s “principle of anarchy,” [2] Emmanuel Levinas’s “anarchic responsibility,” Jacques Derrida’s “responsible anarchism,” Michel Foucault’s “anarcheology,” Giorgio Agamben’s “profanatory anarchism,” and Jacques Rancière’s “staging anarchy”—refers directly to Proudhon, to Bakunin, or to the movements for which these two nineteenth-century thinkers provided the inspiration and theoretical groundwork. On the contrary, the philosophers under study generally make a point of explicitly distancing themselves from anarchist thinkers and movements, and sometimes even adopt political positions far removed from theirs: Levinas clearly defends the necessity of a state, Rancière argues for a kind of police force, and Foucault remains fundamentally attached to the principle of government. At no point does any of them go so far as to call into question what Proudhon termed “the governmental prejudice.” As Malabou observes:

Let me repeat my point: Not for a moment do philosophers consider the possibility that we might live without being governed. Self-management and self-determination are not serious political possibilities for any one of them. In the final analysis, government is always safe, even if it takes the form of self-government.

Malabou emphasizes that while none of these philosophers is strictly anarchist, all of them have inevitably been influenced by anarchism: Whether they like it or not, whether they acknowledge it or not, the philosophers of anarchy are indebted in one way or another to anarchist thinkers and movements. This is primarily evident at the terminological and conceptual level. For as Malabou recalls, it was Proudhon who first gave a positive meaning to the concept of “anarchy”: “Without this revolution in meaning, none of the philosophical concepts of anarchy developed in the twentieth century could have seen the light of day.”

More fundamentally, one could hypothesize that all of these philosophers have been influenced by the radicalness attributed to anarchism (rightly so, though at times in a rather folkloric manner): Beyond the word itself, it is the gesture of anarchism that fascinates and inspires. The imaginary that has developed around anarchism, and more specifically around the anarchist bomber of the late nineteenth century, is no doubt largely unfounded (very few attacks were actually carried out), but it has nevertheless left a profound impact on the intellectual world, on literature, and on legislation. [3] Philosophy—in particular that which presents itself as “deconstruction” (a translation of Heidegger’s Destruktion)—may well be haunted by this imaginary of radicalness and destruction.

Yet, while the philosophers under study have clearly drawn inspiration from anarchism and have even “stolen” the concept, they have also partially betrayed and diluted its meaning. As Malabou observes, none of them has taken this inspiration to its limit; all have remained “at the edge of the radicalness they advocate.” And this not only because they have not dared to declare themselves anarchist, but also because their attachment to the governmental prejudice has prevented them from deepening their own deconstructionist approaches. As if through symmetry, their lack of political radicalness has been accompanied by a lack of philosophical radicalness. This is what the central chapters of the book attempt to demonstrate.

The Anti-intellectualism of Anarchists

According to Malabou, not only is the philosophy of anarchy influenced by anarchism, but the anarchist movement would in turn benefit from the influence of this philosophy: “Philosophy makes it possible for anarchy to undertake the work that anarchism did not do.” One should therefore engage in the deepening, radicalization, and “rejuvenation of classic anarchism,” in line with what has come to be known as “post-anarchism.” Specifically, one should: deconstruct the rationalism, positivism, and naturalism of classic anarchism along with Schürmann, Derrida, and Levinas; desubstantialize the concept of power along with Foucault; renounce the fetishization of excess and the celebration of transgression in favor of desacralization and profanation along with Agamben [4]; and engage in a broader rethinking of social and political emancipation along with Rancière. Since the late 1990s, a number of authors and activists described as “post-anarchists” have claimed to pursue one or the other of these endeavors.

However, there seem to be some fundamental limits to this rapprochement. Anarchists’ reluctance to engage with philosophy, which Malabou deplores and deems “paradoxical,” does have its reasons.

The works of Schürmann, Levinas, Derrida, and Agamben—and to a lesser extent those of Foucault and Rancière—are undeniably highly theoretical and speculative and sometimes even completely abstruse. Moreover, reading and understanding these works require mastery of specialized academic knowledge, or at least of a set of philosophical landmarks and references that are far from being widely shared. Anarchism, which is oriented more towards practice and revolutionary organizing than towards speculative elaboration, remains for its part profoundly anti-intellectual [5] and wary of excessive theoretical detours. Malabou acknowledges this “hostility to philosophical reflection” and finds it regrettable: “Anarchism must open itself up to philosophical dialogue.” It should be noted, however, that this hostility concerns a certain kind of philosophical reflection, namely that which involves too many mediations and is only accessible to an elite. To be suspicious of intellectuals—of their sophistications and of the power they sometimes arrogate to themselves—is obviously not to reject intelligence and reflection as such. Anarchists are not so much against philosophy—or even metaphysics—as they are against its academic capture and speculative inflation, which sometimes veer into Byzantine complexity, as is the case in the philosophical works discussed by Malabou.

In fact, one wonders to whom the book is addressed: Given that the central chapters are devoted to erudite commentaries on difficult authors who themselves tend to use sophisticated references, it is difficult to see how these various reflections—which might be said to constitute an “anarchism of intellectuals” [6]—could directly feed into the practices of anarchist activists as Malabou seems to expect. As Renaud Garcia writes in Le désert de la critique. Déconstruction et politique (L’Échappée, 2015, pp. 25 and 44): “The adoption of the deconstructionist ‘tool-box of ideas’ by the most radical currents of social critique actually contributes to making [this critique] unintelligible to most of the people who might be interested in it.” And Garcia later asks: “Who are the deconstructionists writing for?”

An Anarchist Ontology?

However, the fact that anarchism is on principle hostile to philosophical flights of fancy does not prevent philosophers from interrogating the philosophical or ontological foundations of anarchism—even if this leads them to the conclusion that there are no foundations. In reality, Malabou conducts precisely this sort of—properly philosophical—interrogation in her book: Is there a philosophy, or even an ontology, of anarchism? And if so, should one view philosophical an-archy as the philosophy of political anarchism? Does the lack of a principle of command ultimately rest on the lack of a metaphysical first principle? In short: Is it possible to develop an ontologico-political anarchism? Malabou has her doubts:

We must concede that all attempts to think being and politics together have been a disaster. From Plato’s “communism” to the mathematical totalitarianism of some forms of Maoism, through the Heideggerian night, the elaboration of connections between ontology and politics authorized by the original bricolage of archē, which, as we have seen, extends its reign in both fields, has given rise to nothing but terrifying dead-ends. [...] Why risk a new impediment? Wouldn’t it be better, far better, to make a cut between being and anarchism, to stop ontologizing politics and politicizing ontology [...]?

And yet, Malabou specifically attempts this ontologization of anarchism in her conclusion. She even goes so far as to claim that “this is the task dawning in anarchism” and that there is “urgency” in taking up these philosophical challenges. But unlike what is sometimes implicitly or explicitly the case in the various currents of anarchism, the ontology defended by Malabou does not rest on a first principle: Reason, Nature, Life, or even God (for there does exist a Christian anarchism, as illustrated in particular by Leo Tolstoy). The ontology on which anarchism must rest, or which constitutes an-archism, is literally without principle (an-archē): It is therefore, in the words of Malabou, a “plastic ontology.” As the author observes:

As the only political form that is always to be invented, to be shaped before it exists, precisely because it depends on no beginning or command, anarchism is never what it is. That’s where it’s being lies. This plasticity is the meaning of its being, the meaning of its question.

Malabou thus returns to a concept she has been working on since her first book, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality, and Dialectic, [7] though she unfortunately does not develop it further. After pointing out that this idea was already present in Bakunin—who defined anarchism as a “plastic force” in which “no office petrifies, becomes fixed and remains irrevocably attached to a single person” (quoted by Malabou)—she elevates plasticity to the paradoxical rank of ontological principle of anarchism. This ontological anarchism does not constitute a defined and closed metaphysical system; on the contrary, it is at once flexible and plural, open and multiple, irreducible to a single hegemonic principle yet woven and dispersed between the different points of a “philosophical archipelago.” Anarchism is pluralism. What remains to be done is to trace its lines of flight.

In the very last pages of the book, Malabou addresses more concrete political considerations. Here Audrey Tang provides an unexpected source of inspiration: This Taiwanese cybernetician, free software programmer, and self-proclaimed “conservative anarchist” has been Minister of Digital Affairs in the Taiwanese government since 2016. Malabou expresses astonishment at the presence of an anarchist in government.

However, she does not take offense at this state of affairs, but seems pleased by it: “Joining institutions to better subvert them. Many will respond: These are the words of the powerful. And yet...” It is as if the search for “the governmental prejudice” conducted throughout the chapters on Schürmann, Levinas, Derrida, Agamben, and Rancière came to a halt with the end of the textual analysis, at the very moment when the question of action, organization, and strategic choices—anarchism’s main concern [8]—posed itself more concretely. As if by giving anarchism a philosophical (and academic) aura that it did not ask for, the ontologization of anarchism defended by Malabou paradoxically led to its depoliticization—for political anarchism is indeed hardly discussed in the book. As if, ultimately, “being an anarchist” were merely a matter of words.

Catherine Malabou, Au voleur ! Anarchisme et philosophie, Paris, Puf, 2022, 408 p., 21 €.


by
Cyril Legrand
, 21 November

Comments

Wayne Price (not verified) Sun, 11/24/2024 - 13:59

Reviewing a book on anarchism and philosophy, the author points out that the book says little about anarchism as a political theory and movement and discusses philosophy almost entirely in terms of modern "French" theorists, who tend to be hopelessly obscure. There seems to be almost nothing about the philosophical work of Bakunin (a Left Hegelian and materialist), or Kropotkin (who wrote a good deal on his materialist philosophy and about naturalist morality) or others, such as Paul Goodman (who wrote on pragmatism and literature). And then the anarchists are regarded as "anti-intellectual"!

anon (not verified) Sun, 11/24/2024 - 14:44

In reply to by Wayne Price (not verified)

Bakunin was one of the most antisemitic anarchists in history (besides Proudhon) and he advocated for an “invisible dictatorship”; I’m fine with never hearing about him again

anarcho (not verified) Mon, 11/25/2024 - 00:15

In reply to by anon (not verified)

Yes, both Bakunin and Proudhon made anti-Semitic remarks -- in passing and rarely. In terms of Proudhon, for example, in the thousands of pages I've read, I've seen about a dozen comments which were anti-Semitic -- all of which added nothing to his arguments (i.e., were not fundamental to his ideas). The same can be said about Bakunin -- yes, a few anti-Semitic remarks none of which are fundamental to his ideas. If you bothered to read their writings you would know that -- and the importance of their ideas.

In terms of "invisible dictatorship", that is definitely an unfortunate expression but when it is looked at in context it is about the role of anarchists influencing popular struggles and movements. See J.3.7 Doesn't Bakunin's "Invisible Dictatorship" prove that anarchists are secret authoritarians? of An Anarchist FAQ.

Wayne Price (not verified) Mon, 11/25/2024 - 15:20

In reply to by anon (not verified)

There is a reason we call ourselves "anarchists" and not "Bakuninists" or "Kropotkinians" or "Malatestaites." Unlike the Marxists, Leninists, Trotskyists, or Maoists, we anarchists do not name our tendency after one or a couple of great people. All the classical anarchists (the "founders") had major faults, and we see further--if only because we stand on their shoulders.

Yes, Proudhon wrote antisemitic passages in his private notebooks, and was openly misogynistic and homophobic. But he pioneered the ideas of stateless decentralist-federalism and self-managed industry. Bakunin, after years of being a pan-Slavist nationalist, abandoned most of his elitism, even if he continued to have flare-ups of anti-Semitism and racist hatred of Germans, especially when disputing with Marx (whose weaknesses most anarchists are aware of!). Kropotkin made lasting and essential contributions to anarchist theory, but supported the Allies in World War I (partially out of Germanophobia). And so on. But anarchism has continued to develop and improve over time. To refuse to learn from earlier anarchists because of their undoubted weaknesses is to cut ourselves off from a great deal of valuable insights.

anon (not verified) Sun, 11/24/2024 - 19:12

This is so fucking bad theory when you base your ontology of anarchy on "without principles". As if like the other philosophers she by-design seeks to avoid the political relation the term more directly pertains to, being "without prince/principality" (i.e. from Greek "archon/arches/archia"). That's theoretically convenient for how this allows for hierarchies and even authoritarianism to exist while pretending "anarchism", as after all this distinct, erroneous definition limits itself to the confines of principle.

So revealing to be having such intellectual dishonesty (or poverty) coming from an elite European university, as Europe has only been rotting on all aspects except for finance and authoritarianism...

"Just because you can read books and quote them in your essay doesn't make one a great intellectual."
- me

alex (not verified) Mon, 11/25/2024 - 18:29

i left behind any kind of formal philosophy in part because of one of the tensions pointed at here which i continue to find at least personally interesting: the way in which anarchy acts as one of what i would call the limits of formal philosophy. as i saw it coming out of undergrad, there seemed to me to be an obvious hole in all the theory i'd engaged with so far, which was that taken to its logical conclusion one arrived at one formulation or aspect of anarchy or another, which is somewhat frequently as i remember it treated as proof of a given theory's failure in the secondary literature. maybe the author of this book lays out some examples but for me a big one was kant's categorical imperative; on my view it works as long as you dont give it any content, its draw so to speak is the sense that we have this sense of a moral ought, and one might find in that a part of the reason so many people are drawn to laws. but as a formal philosophy it (typically) draws back in the last instance and asserts or demands that the law be explicated, codified, produced as a series of categorically true propositions, or otherwise discarded as broken. i thought my professors played with that tension in a way i came to view as cowardly and insincere, because of and despite how interesting it often was. i still think that, but i appreciate more that they couldnt "go the distance" so to speak because to do so would be to repudiate not just the material basis of their lives and livelihoods but the constitutive basis of their intellectual practices; they would have to stop being philosophers and start asking what it meant to be an anarchist. i tried to do that--and feels like overall i failed!--but i would say that it wasn't overcoming, evading, transcending, syncretizing, or eliminating the limit that eventually brought both anarchist and more academic-philosophical ideas and practices more thoroughly into my life, but clarifying and choosing for myself both concrete conditions (other people) and a sense of the ineffable that i was willing to take as my own limit, which is to say accept as the boundary of my being and assert as the vanishing point of anything i am becoming. in other words, there was no way i was getting to philosophy from anarchy or vice versa, so i abandoned both as desires and was able to recover from that something like both as drives. i think this is a pretty common thing to do and i have noticed that a lot of the ppl i see describing themselves as "post-anarchists" seem to have done it somewhat differently than i have but whatever, to each their own, i don't care for that label and will leave it to them

anon (not verified) Tue, 11/26/2024 - 16:13

In reply to by alex (not verified)

nice expound as expected, alex. what you're describing reminds me of the various anti-philosophical standpoints that can root individual (heterodox) practices when people do it through a self-reflective lens. eg daoism, ecocentrism, absurdism, egoism, nihilism can all be ways of asserting "i am an animal with biases and limitations, and a unique perspective resulting from a combination of my agency and circumstances."

to fully recognize individual agency in this world means recognizing the agency of all those state actors who will choose to uphold the status quo in so many ways. it is possible to be personally inured on a case by case basis, but individual decision making basically guarantees an abundance of conflict and contention. one of the hardest things for me irl is seeing people use soft social coercion to try to influence their proximate relations, but i'll admit this is a predilection of many, and as a conscious, observant actor i can also try to influence these things in my way... *i dunno*

alex (not verified) Tue, 11/26/2024 - 18:28

In reply to by anon (not verified)

your latter point is something i've thought about and encountered a lot as i help raise an infant. it is frequently tempting to use that kind of dynamic to change or direct his behavior in a way that i think would be "in his interest" or whatever--because what does he know--and at the same time i can see in my resistance to doing so a path towards sort of neutering myself, maybe availing myself of one of the sort of programmatic synthetic languages available in any number of baby books and momfluencer accounts or whatever, designed to cure ourselves of any inkling of force or coercion so the infant's experience can therefore be free and clean (of what? of us?). either path means approaching this child through engineering language and performing in such a way that will drive him to do what i want, either consciously or by convincing myself that i just want whatever he wants, no matter that i created an elaborate, maybe even scientific environment within which to bind his ability to express any of it for himself. in practice none of this is a concern at all because its generally (not always) pretty easy to avoid it once youve decided not to, but i think about what it means for people to extend these kinds of approaches to other settings. agamben is mentioned in this piece and i recommend his work on language and infancy along these lines--it has been useful for me at least to think through how i do and do not choose to intervene in other people's lives, and what it is im trying to get at when i do, which is usually to take something away from them

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