Some Quick Thoughts on Anarchist Theory After the Decline of Symbolic Efficiency

  • Posted on: 1 December 2016
  • By: thecollective

From Ding Politik by Duane Rousselle

It has become a common argument among a certain school of political theorists to claim that there has been a decline in symbolic efficiency within recent political and social history. These scholars go on to argue that this period of decline is marked historically and it presents itself as a movement inward toward the political ontology of drive and away from the political logic of desire. Moreover, it represents the disappearance of the subject-supposed-to-know, that is, the subject who, because of his place within the structure of ruling, knows the answer or the deep secrets of our lives as political agents. However, what has been less highlighted by these scholars is the role that Lacan’s later work played in the formation of this theory. For example, these scholars seldom acknowledge that Lacan’s later work – which provided the foundation for this theory of the decline of symbolic efficiency – also offered a solution.

So, rather quickly, here is the problem: symbolic efficiency, for the early and middle periods of Lacan’s teaching, was an essential ingredient for the constitution of the speaking being. The subject cannot exist except as a consequence of the paternal function, a function which was expressed also in the French homophone: non-du-pere (nom-du-pere). First, for example, there was one non-du-pere which structured the subject, and then, there were perhaps many names of the father, until, finally, one could do without the names of the father. For the early Lacan the foreclosure of the name of the father results always in psychosis, madness – a fundamental impossibility at the level of speaking and language. But for the later Lacan the name-of-the-father could very well be foreclosed but only if the subject makes up for that missing father through a particular know-how (savior-faire), a know-how to make use of the semblance of paternal authority.

It is this theory of ‘know-how’ and of ‘semblant’ with which recent political theorists have seemed to avoid. This brings me, finally, to my point: anarchist theorists today stand to benefit from this missing “affirmative” component of “know-how” within the theory of the decline of symbolic efficiency. However, before addressing this possibility I want to highlight the movement of anarchist theory in the last few decades. What I am offering here is a truncated version of that history. First, during the time of ‘classical theory’ anarchists believed that there was one place of power, it was the State. This was a unitary place of power, and it was the place from which one might trace a line, a line moving in one direction, toward the great mass of people who were robbed from their freedom and autonomy by this place of power. Consequently, the political task was only to remove the place of power so that freedom and autonomy may be restored. Let us refer to this as the first moment.

I want to be clear: during the first moment the concept of “autonomy” was not at all present within the classical texts of Bakunin or Kropotkin or others. This word, and indeed this reading of classical theory, was only made available in the second period, retroactively, as it were. The modern anarchists wished to highlight the concept of autonomy and inject it into the classical texts. They wanted to present a critique of the classical concept of power, a conception of power which was no doubt present within the classical texts but which was buried, or latent. The second moment, then, was precisely this critique of the logic of “autonomy,” the logic of spontaneous self-organization, the logic of a battle against the State. However, it also became clear that there were many places of power during the classical period; it was not just the State, but also the Church, and so on. However, one thing is most certainly clear: there was a finite amount of enemies, a finite array of places of power, and, nonetheless, power was thought to move unidirectionally and only to repress. The second period was the ‘third wave’ or the period of ‘modern’ and ‘post-anarchism.’ It was the period of critique.

The period of critique found its way toward a secondary internal moment: affirmation. After the critique – and, this is essential, it was only after the critique was made that it became possible – there was a moment of rereading the tradition. The second moment took hold of the classical tradition and transformed it into a modern moment: new theorists were introduced, new readings of Bakunin and Kropotkin (and others) were introduced so as to highlight the way in which they subverted classical theory. Stirner became central, and so too did Landauer. What is most interesting is that even those who critiqued the critique of the post-anarchists, that is, even those who critiqued the reading of classical theory for having an essentialist understanding of power and human nature, joined in the spirit of the time. It was important then for all anarchist theorists to demonstrate that power is productive as well as destructive (e.g., Bakunin’s infamous claim in his political letter that destruction is also a creative passion), and that there are infinite and ever-changing zones of political contestation.

And so, the concept of ‘autonomy’ was abandoned. In the current moment, when, finally, anarchists are beginning to offer affirmative ontologies of multiplicity (fractal ontology, anarchic metaphysics, etc), we have retained a concept of political contestation that subtracts from itself any notion of a central revolution and that embraces, against any logic of spontaneous and autonomy action, only a revolution of dinner parties, friendship networks, diverse cultural production, and so on. The world is complex and the only thing that will save us is to make it even more complex, networked, fractal, and, finally, inclusive. Finally, we return to the wider frame with which I opened these notes: the decline of symbolic efficiency.

It is my claim that we are in a unique historical moment which permits us to return to the concept of anarchist autonomy and revolution with a new focus. When the nom-du-pere is no longer functioning it is possible to introduce a theory of the know-how of the anarchist: auto-nom-me. Recall that for Lacan, in his famous seminar on James Joyce, asked the question: was James Joyce mad? In other words, was he what today Jacques-Alain Miller might label an “ordinary psychotic” (or what others refer to as an ‘untriggered’ psychotic)? There is significant evidence that points in this direction, however, instead of reviewing it I will only ask my readers to consult Lacan’s seminar on Joyce, a seminar which included a prominent Joyce scholar who spoke at length about “A Portrait of THE artist as a Young Man.” For my part, I presume the thesis to be correct – Joyce stabilized his psychosis and kept it in check precisely through the production of a certain know-how, a certain know-how to make use of the semblant of a name of the father.

The anarchist knows how to make use of auto-nom-me, that is, a spontaneous affirmation of the self, which, precisely through contestation, also presents itself as an auto-non-me, demonstrated most effectively during times of contestation with police. Moreover, the anarchist, who, like the ordinary psychotic, is alert on matters concerning fashion, also knows-how to make use of the au-ton-numbre. The logic of autonomy, in any case, may be unearthed, once again, in the work of Max Stirner. Recall that Stirner invented a name for himself, a name, in fact, given to him by those around him – and he internalized it. His real name, as well as the extent of his authorship, is an enigma. Johann Schmitt did not sign his name to his major political works. Instead, he invented a name for himself, a name, as well as a figure – a figure which marks his body there on the brow. Names name me not, claimed Stirner, and, what we learn from this, is that the proper names – the names of the law – are inadequate to the task – the only adequacy results, finally, from the self-naming, which, we might suggest, is a self-naming completed very early in the life of the man.

In any case, I do not wish to partake in a detailed examination of Stirner’s project. This would no doubt be a fruitful task (e.g., take, for example, the fact that the German word for “name” appears in the most unlikely places through the text, for things that have, in many cases, nothing to do with names at all). In any case, Stirner’s entire work consists of an attempt to create a sense of self for himself, to defend, in a sense, an Ego worthy of the name, that is, a “unique” Ego which may find a place for itself in the world and which may be the supreme Ego, that is, the Ego which Neitzsche may have stolen from him. I want only to begin to mark out the new moment within which the anarchist project may be renewed, and renewed precisely by rereading the concept of autonomy. It is no longer fashionable to merely critique the concept, as we did in the second period of our scholarship, but we must rather know-how to make use of it during a period of symbolic decline.



In English, please!

I don't have a Postmodernism to English translator on my computer.

Cosmologists are often in error, but never in doubt

Lev Landau

Dr. Duane Rousselle the "prominent anarchist scholar":

This whole "academic anarchist" phenomenon disgusts me, where ideas of relevance and force are sucked dry of their potency and morphed through obscurantism into some bullshit career for intellectuals playing at being radicals that have zero connection to social struggles, conflict infrastructure, anarchist forms of life or even the actual development of anarchist ideas. I'm not "anti-intellectual" or trying to reproduce the "bookfairism/strugglismo" debate but I think it's clear that the majority of these so-called academic anarchists are self-referential careerist parasites.

yes. there are some anarchist and left communist academics doing great work, but not many. very very few. and the nature of the academy makes it very hard for us to connect our work to the real questions that 'move' us, so to speak. from my experience many people who seem to be 'on the team' when pushed on their politics are just crappy liberals who care about the periphery and not anyone else (pomo anthro and '___ studies' people are the absolute worst with this).

also total ad hominem, work on your posture Rousselle. I spend all my time hunched over a desk too.

Stirner and his translators are cool, learn proper english and get over it.

i believe i'm considered a card-carrying bookfair nihilist, and i entirely agree with this comment. although i did not click on the youtube link, so there is some wiggle room there...
being intellectual is NOT the same as being academic. caring about ideas is not the same as excess verbiage. wolfi is one great example of this, whether or not you agree with his thinking.

I must be dumb.I didn't understand the point of this article. Maybe there is someone out there who can explain it to me.Is symbolic decline the same thing as the degradation of language? What has happened to clarity and precision ?

Neither Stirner nor Nietzsche (whose name you misspelled) were trying to create a reified-I or reified-ego identity for themselves. Please stop propagating this asinine interpretation - which is maintained by decontextualizing quotes from them to use as cool one-liners - that an honest reading of their writing ought to dispel, e.g.:
"Main thought! The individual himself is a fallacy. Everything which happens in us is in itself something else which we do not know. ‘The individual’ is merely a sum of conscious feelings and judgments and misconceptions, a belief, a piece of the true life system or many pieces thought together and spun together, a ‘unity’, that doesn’t hold together. We are buds on a single tree—what do we know about what can become of us from the interests of the tree! But we have a consciousness as though we would and should be everything, a phantasy of ‘I’ and all ‘not I.’ Stop feeling oneself as this phantastic ego! Learn gradually to discard the supposed individual! Discover the fallacies of the ego! Recognize egoism as fallacy! The opposite is not to be understood as altruism! This would be love of other supposed individuals! No! Get beyond ‘myself’ and ‘yourself’! Experience cosmically!”
- Nietzsche

That's lame, Bellamy. Says nothing and provides with little creative input as to how changing the social reality through subversive ego-anarchy. Keep philosophizing as you've been doing for about two years by now... you're on the right track to be packaged and sealed by the system, if you weren't already. And as I told you sooo many times... All what the sausage fests of the gaytopia achieve is just to bring back Ancient Greece. Progress? Unlikely.

Seems like ultra-retrograde millenial traditionalism is getting big again these days. Watch out.

If civilization is all there is. All the agape sex fueled relations minus the restrictive aspects of their mythological systems as well as the Socrates killing rules. I'll also take Roman era roads. They can be adjusted for deaccelerated inflation with appropriated technology. A ludic thinker can be creative with old civilized epochs.

Definitely, there have existed many good models from antiquity. I like the Spartan system but with the family institution kept intact, and without compulsory military service and the execution of gay guys who wish to be artists or something, not that I'm gay.

...and do I have the right to not agree with Nietzsche on his denial of the individual, if I haven't written books that were (presumably) edited in significant parts by my proto-Nazi crazy sister?

Yes, Nietzsche not only wanted to get rid of the ego [subsume it with the natural relational Self] as in an individual using the subject 'I' as if it were the jumpstart causal author of some effect, but wanted to get rid of the concept of 'being' which stems from 'ego'. Like Wittgenstein, he believed that "our understanding is bewitched by language";

“In its origin language belongs in the age of the most rudimentary form of psychology. We enter a realm of crude fetishism when we summon before consciousness the basic presuppositions of the metaphysics of language, in plain talk, the presuppositions of reason. Everywhere it sees a doer and doing; it believes in will as the cause; it believes in the ego, in the ego as being, in the ego as substance, and it projects this faith in the ego-substance upon all things — only thereby does it first create the concept of “thing.” Everywhere “being” is projected by thought, pushed underneath, as the cause; the concept of being follows, and is a derivative of, the concept of ego. In the beginning there is that great calamity of an error that the will is something which is effective, that will is a faculty. Today we know that it is only a word.” – Nietzsche, ‘Twilight of the Idols’

So why do people continue to resist this [summarily dismiss any 'post-modern' sounding understandings] and cling to 'being-based' 'keep it simple stupid' phraseology where one can 'call a spade a spade'?

One reason is that the ego insists on being a champion of 'justice' [the Western moral judgement and retribution based excuse for 'justice']. As in Cervantes 'Don Quixote', by vanquishing the evil ones out there, one makes oneself into a 'white knight'. Subsuming the ego with the natural Self also subsumes the blame-game and denies the ego its 'white knight' status. As in the Iroquois 'Peacemaker' legend, the ethic of peacemaking involves 'shaking hands with the devil' and transforming relations so as to subsume 'binary opposites'. Restorative justice is all about this. It is not about 'vanquishing evil' so that 'good may reign'.

the KISS ethic is deeply ingrained in Western culture an binary logic is its foundation. Interestingly, the article mentioned that;

"It was important then for all anarchist theorists to demonstrate that power is productive as well as destructive (e.g., Bakunin’s infamous claim in his political letter that destruction is also a creative passion), and that there are infinite and ever-changing zones of political contestation."

This simply reinforces the binary view, by not bringing forth the physical reality of our actual experience wherein it is impossible to isolate "production" or "destruction" as processes in themselves; i.e. It is impossible to construct a house in the forest without destroying some forest. In other words, as Mach, Schroedinger, Nietzsche and other philosophers have noted, we live in a transforming relational continuum where there is neither 'being' nor 'binaries'.

What Stirner is literally saying is the ego/individual that can be named is not the eternal ego/individual. Also, Der Einzige is not trying to reign supreme, it is simply striving to become and experience. All that mediates against this is nothing. That includes reigning supremacy.

Hey Bellamy!

If the historiographical facts are to be trusted and correct, the author notes that Stirner received and accepted his name, from his friends, internalized it, and yet, that his real name, his name by law, "remained an enigma". Similarly, the ontology of uniqueness (haecceity) caught up in Scotus's account is the unnamable ground of being, this-here, which was created before time in the mind of God is an engima--a name on a stone that only God knows. (Stay with me for a bit). This name which no one knows, that only God knows, can be pantheistically inverted for a universe that knows us uniquely, or perhaps, totally denied in that there is nothing to know but what arises in moments of value, deemed as such by the individuals at the site of this or that body-soul composite. Whatever. For Scouts the name is formal, not material--but evidently "this" (uttered in confessio) specifies nothing at all while also naming, perhaps the tongue, voice, whatever.

Now, presumably the unique has no property, which distances it from the propertied individual of the state. Therefore it seems likely that an "ego worthy of the name", by this account, would be simply "an enigma"--which is neither something that can be universal, nor something too specific.

Anyways. I wonder why you're so caught up on discerning the true Nietzsche, why it bothers you to name another face of neitzsche as such... Do you recall the completely disrespecful debate between "derrida" and "searle" when "derrida" started calling "searle", "sarl"? (Limited Inc.) The author is dead in a world of semiotic interpretation; names therefore function merely as referring devices to an unnamable private character that either God knows, or of which there is nothing to know.

In plain words symbolic efficiency is the accurate description of a fact or concept. In the context of political power it describes the transparency and honesty of the discourse, no hidden agendas or conspiracies. This is just the basics, in the context of Lacanian psychology, "decline of symbolic efficiency" alludes to the 'self-named' and self-defined sovereign individual's self-deception, delusion, whatever, due to language, but I'm just too tired to take Lacan rants beyond the initial concept, it hurts my head, and as the other poster mentioned, it's too obscure.

Bellamy beat me to it!

this essay is a strange call to reform reification.

The author is challenging Stirner's blaim that his " self-name " is a priori, by stating that the "self-name" is the empirical " I ", a product of experience, therefore still a posterior because of its emergence out of language/experience, Only the infant could be said to have a complete individual autonomy since its cognitive processes are pre-symbolic, its own self-awareness is in unison with its surroundings without it having to name objects, therefore it is efficient. It's really splitting hairs and overly dissecting terminology concerning Stirner's use of his unique " I " and the "self-name " he calls it. This is my interpretation I may be incorrect.

*claim* not blaim

postmodernism and all of its variations (poststructuralism, postcolonialism, postanarchism, postmarxism, etc) are the clearest articulation of the class enemy that anarchists have had in almost a century. death to this bullshit. total obscurantist garbage designed to befuddle not to provide clarity. I'd rather be forced to listen to a dumb egoist debate an idiot platformist for the rest of my fucking life than read another word of this bullshit.

Another theory is possible. stop playing other people's games and let's write one.

Word. Fuck those West Coast phallosophers! May they keep rotting in the asshole of history.

this text seems difficult at first read, but with scrutiny, doesn't say much at all. The function of a proper name picks out this or that body, given law, aka given your actual state-name--better, however, given willingness to respond, in say Searle's account of proper names; self-naming, on the other hand, denotes just what ontology one is willfully accepting, when and how, and thereby leaves out the reality that one might not feel up to the name, that such is one more father.

Why, however, does it follow that without father figures, one is lost, psychotic, requiring some kind of know-how, or narrative? Self-naming indicates the individuated freedom to be independent, without property, but is that really so distinct from autonomy? Or was autonomy, in the illusory second wave of irrelevant anarchist theorists, simply collective autonomy being one more father figure, one more repetition of power?

Maybe we should ask instead, What is the potential, genuine, autonomy of the war-machine, or Agamben's form-of life?--and be done with the hair splitting.


the article seems to refer to 'autonomy' in an 'intentionist' sense, although 'situationist autonomy' is evidently in a natural precedence over 'intentionist' autonomy.

"The second moment, then, was precisely this critique of the logic of “autonomy,” the logic of spontaneous self-organization, the logic of a battle against the State."

the words 'self-organization', in the associating of 'autonomy' with the 'logic of spontaneous self-organization', suggests purpose-driven action on the part of multiple individuals with common purpose.

there is also 'situationist autonomy' wherein one accepts that one is not 'in control' of the unfolding relational dynamics one is situationally included in, yet if one is in touch with one's 'autonomy', one can be inspired to 'rise to the occasion' and in so doing, transform the situation one is included in. This is where Nietzsche's 'amor fati'-reconciled 'uebermensch' comes in [lets his 'autonomy' pull his creative potentials into blossom].

The 'uebermensch' is not a control freak that uses his 'autonomy' to launch intention-driven attacks to eliminate the seats of power of the state, the church, the corporate world and move onward and upward to deterministically construct a 'desired future'.

'situationist autonomy' recalls ju-jitsu and the oriental martial arts where the relational dynamics of the unfolding situation are the inductive actualizers, orchestrators and shapers of the creative potentials needed to transform and tame (restore harmony in) the unfolding relational situation.

As John Lennon observed; "Life is what happens to us while we're busy making other plans" In the same vein, in the terms of Mach and Bohm; "the unfolding relational situation is in a natural precedence over our intention-driven constructions of 'desired futures"

Nietzsche's advice is to reconcile ourselves to this relational symmetry as is captured in 'amor fati'.

'autonomy' is not constrained to being interpreted in a deterministic sense as "the logic of spontaneous self-organization"

'situationist autonomy' is where we liberate ourselves from being slaves to Sisyphian attempts that make use of [intentionist] 'autonomy' to attempt to deterministically construct 'desired futures', and instead allow the unfolding relational situation to be the inductive actualizer of our creative potentials [in our transforming of relational dissonances into relational harmonies].

The trouble, I think, with fixing the content of autonomy is precisely that it shouldn't be fixed. I think you deepen the conversation rather well, however. But consider what someone may mean by TAZ, or PAZ, etc., It could be spontaneous, or it could be planned. It could be lacking in harmony (and thus have a specific harmony), or it could ring with "true" harmony. It is seemingly only potential-which doesn't say much; so, it might be whatever, without any principles doled out by the left--or it might not be. We might even go so far as saying its meaning is isolated, unobservable from the outside. To discount what it could be seems improper.

Perhaps you are saying this in specifying the relational situation as an inductive actualizer; It just seems to me that your perception lands a little too hard on a rejection of the individual moment, which, ironically, you say functions in restoring balance. There is more to individualism than I think you always leave out, and it seems far more fruitful to specify this in not specifying it. The third wave of dealing with the inefficient symbolic is (perhaps) to do whatever--which is importantly distinct (formally) from "Do Nothing". That is, Whatever is one step prior to Anything and so also Nothing, in that it virtually includes everything.

In order to specify natural harmony over and against unnatural harmony presumably we'd have to have a concept of what "nature" is, and it seems evident, to me anyways, that with human ecology being asymptotically approaching 100% unnatural life, there is no point in privileging conservation ideals. To intentionally restore the balance, say, in a war machine, to rise up as (an) autonomous individual(s) giving one's will into a larger moment, may be necessary or unnecessary precisely because there is no way to define The War Machine, given the flexibility of TAZ.

The author specifies some forms of naming, as being propertyless, as when one takes a name for themselves, and yet no one knows (but the author)--Kierkegaard did this. But what if the name (the war machine, the TAZ, the network of barely-individuals) is simply (defn): nothing of the world? Is that too much content (meaning), or just enough (non-meaning) to give passive nihilism some gusto?

the physical reality of our actual experience is of our unique situational inclusion in a transforming relational continuum. our 'autonomy' is like that of the sailboater; i.e. he derives his power and direction from the transforming relational dynamics he is uniquely, situationally included in. The sailboater form of 'autonomy' draws more on creative potentials than the more common 'powerboater' form of 'autonomy' which assumes an internal source of drive and direction, built into the notional 'independent being'. In this second, typically Western ideal of 'autonomy', the buck starts and stops with the 'independent being' or 'independent state'. [the Western individual and Western state DECLARE themselves to be 'independent' and 'autonomous'; i.e. they claim that their development and behaviour derives fully and solely from their internal intelligence and purpose drives.]. This is evidently bullshit but it is affirmed by the subject and attribute constructs of noun-and-verb language-and-grammar, as in "Fidel did this and Fidel is responsible for that". If 'Fidel' was a sailboat captain, we could still use such subject-and-verb descriptions and such logical propositions could be proven true, ... but logical propositions are inherently subjective and incomplete: e.g. the logical propositions "Katrina is growing larger and stronger", ... "Katrina is ravaging New Orleans" ... are true, but they make no mention of the physical reality that "Katrina" is not a 'thing-in-itself' with a persisting 'identity' that is the fountainhead of her own development and actions, ... but is a relational form whose development and behaviour is venting influence from the transforming relational continuum she is situationally included in.

So, we have two ways of perceiving 'dynamics' [(a) continuing-in-the-now relational transformation and, (b) the dynamics of independent material objects/organisms/systems in an absolute space and absolute time operating theatre] which associate with two views of 'self' ['big sagacity natural Self' and 'little sagacity ego-self' (Nietzsche)] and two corresponding versions of 'autonomy' [sailboater and powerboater].

The 'TAZ' and 'PAZ' start with the (b) concepts and try to depict a local 'independent autonomous zone', even though the (b) concepts are 'pragmatic idealizations' that do not refer to the physical reality of our actual experience.

I made this as short as i could to keep it in-line in this thread, so thanks in advance, moderators, for NOT removing and relocating this shortened tl;dr version.

Why is it that TAZ and PAZ start in (b) type zones, or, what comes to the same, in powerboat right wing individualist frameworks, and not in sailboat relational continuity? That seems like an assertion without evidence...

bey qualifies his "example" as "interesting" and specifies TAZ as mere abandonment of utopia for face-to-face, unmediated experience. Natural selves with the common purpose of survival in nature would have face-to-face experiences, too.

But is there really a difference between the two positions at root? You say that having your narrative is required for something, it's just not clear what. If you take a nominalist about metaphysical categories like substance, and a realist about metaphysical categories like Being, and you place both in nature, to survive, there would be no difference. What makes a capitalist shitty is not some obscure grammatical principle but the brute fact of storing capital for later use in the continuum of civilized life. Adopting an indigenous aesthetic on metaphysics wouldn't change that because there is nothing problematic about seeing the world through the lens of carved places. For instance, Franciscan metaphysics posits all created beings (stones, plants, animals) on the same plane, with robust metaphysical categories, and doesn't specify the great chain of being that would kick start domestication and readily comport with problems stemming from modern technology (gestell).

Rousselle is a Canadian who has an academic position at Trent University, which is in Ontario. Nothing "west coast" about that.

Which makes him even worse as a source for anarchist theory.

I'm a newbie looking for answers, I surf around sometimes drop in on this site. I just saw Ben Hur and thought hey the jews haven't changed their dancing moves in 2,000yrs, but wondering if Roman sexuality accepted a mother and son to have sexual relationships with the same person, is it me am I a Christian prude or does this even go against anarchist feminists morals?. Its sort of cool in a way as long as the mother doesn't have sex with the son, but the girl, in the movie forget her name, she seems a little uneasy about the mother's advances, or maybe she's secretly converted to Christianity. The question is---do anarchists believe in Christian sexual standards? You all seem everywhere at once, very eclectic lot!

Would be a YUUUGE improvement for this culture of ours. Then we're just one step away from making America(and the rest of the world)Greek again:)

Greco-Roman society was completely against anarchist "morals". Those were brutally phallocratic social orders. Where does "patriarchy" comes from, do you think... and how was it not intertwined to pederasty and homosexuality? The Greeks were the worse, to that regards. Sure, Rome had some limited progresses, but still Hypathia was butchered only for being a female philosopher.

(was a reply to 04:57)

THere's no consensus about any sexuality among "anarchists"... this would mean to enforce some sexual values and models upon people.

But there sure are one or two widely-spread bunches of homo-centric anarchoids predominating in the Anglo-dominated NA. My knowledge of Euro anarchist sexuality is of a really blurry and diverse thing, yet more importantly PRIVATE or at least discreet. As in "self-ownership of your body".

I don't get this whole trend of politicizing sexuality, and using LGBTQ as a counter-power to heteronormativity. This is fucking wrong, and liberal of course.

Also was a reply to 04:57.

Can be and has been used as a weapon against various forms of corporeal expression. This is not to say that the IP route should be the way to take on these problems. Anarchy must be beyond both political and private. Sexuality is a personal affair but personal(unlike private-see the etymology) can be shared and made into more general intercourse.

Humans by default are bisexual as base when all the social pressures are taken off.

Thanks for the feedback for my enquiry very interesting stuff, to anon 9.37 sure it was brutal and patriarchal but that's standard course in most civilizations as far as government and rule, monarchs with queens had heavy-handed male advisors. I'm thinking more behind domestic doors, the common mores of the plebe which SirEinzige describes as semi-binormative or optional bisexuality which is cool.
Anon 9.59 I agree, the 'homo-centric anarchoids' politicize and go hand in hand with the LBGTQ libs in NA tho Europe has discreet opinions suited to the 'self-ownership of your body' attitude which is OK and seems to fall into go with the flow and allow for what SirEinzige calls by default bisexuality as a base when all the social pressures are taken off.
This has been all very helpful, regards.